The pape r pre sents an alte rnative mode l of the e me rge nce and propagation of te chnological re volutions. It propose s an e xplanation of the cluste ring and the spacing of te chnical change in succe ssive re volutions. It provide s argume nts for the re currence of clusters of bold financie rs toge the r with cluste rs of production e ntre pre ne urs and an inte rpre tation of major financial bubble s as massive e pisode s of cre dit cre ation, associate d with the proce ss of assimilation of e ach te chnological re volution. It conclude s by de monstrating that financial capital has a fundame ntal role in the articulation and propagation of te chnological re volutions.
Introduction
Eve r since Kuzne ts publishe d his re vie w 1 of Busine ss Cycle s que stioning the sudde n cluste ring of e ntrepreneurial tale nt that was supposed to accompany each te chnological re volution, 2 Schumpe te r's followe rs have fe lt une asy about this une xplaine d fe ature of his mode l. Ye t apparently no one has stoppe d to que stion Schumpe te r's tre atme nt of the cluste ring of 'wildcat or re ckle ss banking', dismissing it as a random and unne cessary phe nomenon to be e xclude d from his mode l, toge the r with spe culative manias. 3 Ke e ping Schumpe ter's basic assumptions about innovations base d on cre dit cre ation as the force be hind capitalist dynamics, this pape r will pre se nt an alte rnative model of the process of propagation of te chnological re volutions. On that basis it will propose : a) An e xplanation of the cluste ring and the spacing of te chnical change in succe ssive re volutions; b) An argume nt for the re curre nce of cluste rs of bold financie rs toge the r with cluste rs of production e ntre pre ne urs ; and c) An inte rpre tation of major financial bubble s as massive e pisode s of cre dit cre ation, associate d with the proce ss of assimilation of e ach te chnological re volution. The mode l is a stylize d narrative , based on a historically re curring sequence of phase s in the diffusion of e ach te chnological re volution, from its visible irruption afte r a long pe riod of ge station, through its assimilation by the e conomic and social system to the e xhaustion of its innovation pote ntial at maturity. But it is not me re ly de scriptive . It is constructed through the ide ntification of possible causal chains be twe en agents and spheres in capitalist socie ty. What the model atte mpts to do is ide ntify the re pe tition of ce rtain unde rlying patte rns and to propos e plausible e xplanations.
The re ade r is aske d to ke e p this purpose in mind, toge ther with the additional cave at that neither the e vide nce nor much subtle ty can be include d in the limite d space of this pape r. 4 Suffice it to say that this mode l is not a stra itjacke t to be force d upon history. Rathe r than ignore the imme nse richne ss of historical e volution, it e mphasizes the unique ness of e ach occurre nce and re cognize s the many irre gularitie s and overlaps that cannot be captured by abstraction. Its only claim is to se rve as a use ful he uristic tool for historical e xploration and as a frame work for the ore tical analysis.
The Entrepreneur and the Banker
In Schumpe te r's basic de finition of capitalism as 'that form of private prope rty e conomy in which innovations are carried out by me ans of borrowe d money, 5 we find his characte ristic se paration of borrowe r and le nde r, e ntre pre ne ur and banke r, as the two face s of the innovation coin. This is not, howe ve r, how his le gacy has be e n inte rpre te d and e nriche d by the gre at majority of Ne oSchumpe terians. The accent has almost invariably been on the e ntrepreneur to the ne gle ct of the financial agent, no matte r how obviously indispe nsable this age nt may be to innovation.
Ironically, this bias can be trace d back to Schumpe te r himse lf. In many passages he de fines the entrepreneur as the dynamic force driving innovations, he hails him as the le ader, the real he ro of de velopment, the agent of profit cre ation, 6 whe re as the banke r is me re ly a 'bridge ', a facilitator, the one that provide s the me ans for the e ntre pre ne ur to e xe rcise his cre ative will. 7 Furthe rmore, whe reas Schumpeter make s a cle ar contrast be twe e n the bold e ntre prene ur, bre aking all routine s, and the manage r who simply conducts the daily busine ss of the firm, he make s no e quivalent distinction among financiers or banke rs. The se pe rform both the routine functions of inte rme diation and the se le ction of e ntrepreneurial proje cts for credit cre ation. In this latter function the y are e xpected to be highly inde pe nde nt, e xpe rie nce d and se rious. 8 Ye t, as will be furthe r discusse d be low, the re is e ve ry re ason to suspe ct that those radical innovative bre aks also require bold and risk-loving banke rs, be cause the 'se rious' one s would share the same me ntal routine s as the he ads or manage rs of the e stablished firms. In fact, the historical re currence of bursts of 'wildcat or re ckless' finance in the pe riods of inte nse inve stment in te chnological re volutions, suggests that the se phe nome na may be causally conne cte d.
Esse ntially the n, although Schumpeter emphasize d the double age ncy in the proce ss of capitalist de ve lopme nt, he conce ntrate d atte ntion on the production e ntre preneur and ne gle cted the innovative side of the financie r. This has shape d his inte lle ctual le gacy and influe nce d the work of his succe ssors.
The Double Character of Routines as Obstacles and Guides for Innovation
Schumpe ter's innovator ne e ds e xtraordinary will powe r not only be cause he is doing some thing truly ne w but also -and e specially-be cause he must ove rcome the ine rtial force of e stablishe d routine s. Undoubte dly, radical innovations confront the stubborn resistance of routine s on all fronts, ye t routine s have also be e n found to guide succe ssive innovations. The re is a wide body of ne oSchumpe te rian lite rature analyzing the role of natural traje ctorie s as se ts of crite ria ste e ring the dire ction of -and stimulating the se arch for-incre me ntal innovations. 9 Chris Fre e man que stione d the validity of Schumpe te r's tre atme nt of incre me ntal innovations 10 , dismissing the m and conside ring the m simply part of the routine of continuous flow. 11 Inde e d, anyone who witne ssed, in the 1980s and 1990s, the 'cre ative de struction' processes in the microcompute r industry, during the fe rocious competition for both the dominant de sign and the ope rating system, would find it difficult to range such incre me ntal change s in Schumpe te r's none ntre pre ne urial routine ope rations.
In fact, what re se archers have found is not only that continuous incre me ntal change is guide d by share d he uristic routine s but also that many radical innovations e merge as a re sponse to the critical conditions (or de creasing re turns to inve stme nt in te chnical improve ment) face d by the firm or the industry, whe n innovation along a te chnological traje ctory re ache s maturity. 12 Eve n radical innovations, howe ve r, are not usually isolate d e ve nts, nor are the y mainly the re placement of obsole te products or proce sse s. As Schumpe te r ofte n insiste d, radical innovations come in cluste rs. But, such cluste rs are not disconne cted random agglomerations of ne w things. Following upon Ke irste ad's notion of conste llations, 13 Chris Fre e man propose d the te rm ne w te chnology syste ms 14 to e mphasize the strong inte r-relations and inte r-de pe nde nce s among the innovations within a Schumpe terian cluster. Such inte rconnected innovations in products and proce sse s, in e quipme nt and organization, te chnical and manage rial, form a cohe re nt and mutually e nhancing se t of te chnologie s and industrie s, capable of carrying a wave of growth in the e conomy.
This sugge sts that the e volution of a ne w te chnology syste m also follows a ce rtain colle ctive logic, which approximate s what Ne lson and Winte r te rme d ge ne ralize d natural trajectory 15 . Such a se t of innovative routine s will constantly inspire furthe r scie ntific advances and inte racting innovations that contribute to the growth pote ntial of the whole syste m, stimulating change across se ve ral industrie s.
Thus routine s play many role s in re lation to change . The re are routine s for normal unchanged ope ration, which was Schumpe ter's e mphasis, and the re are routine s for guiding se rial innovation, which Schumpe te r te nde d to unde re stimate . 16 Live routine s promote change along known traje ctorie s and discourage change outside of the m. Spe nt routine s be come obstacle s to change but at the same time cre ate the conditions to call forth radical change .
Techno-economic Paradigms as the Meta-routines for a Long Period
Te chnological re volutions are a spe cial type of cluste r. Each one is, in fact, a cluste r of cluste rs or a syste m of te chnology syste ms. The pre se nt author has sugge sted that what distinguishe s a te chnological re volution from an individual te chnology syste m, howe ve r radically ne w, is its all-pe rvasive characte r, its capacity to go be yond the industrie s it cre ates and to provide ge neric technologies that mode rnize the whole e conomic structure . This ove rarching proce ss of transformation take s place thanks to the gradual construction of a ne w te chnoe conomic paradigm, a share d common se nse mode l of be st te chnical and organizational practice for the use of that se t of pe rvasive te chnologie s, which provide s a ge ne ralize d quantum jump in productivity and quality. 17 The te chno-economic paradigm of e ach te chnological re volution de fine s the me ta-routines for the whole e conomy. It provide s the application mode ls for the spre ad of the ne w ge neric technologie s throughout the production landscape as we ll as the ge ne ral principle s guiding ope rations and e ve n the se arch for ne w solutions, be the y to fue l growth or to introduce incre me ntal or radical innovation, be the y for mode rnizing the e stablishe d products, proce sse s or industrie s or for cre ating nove l one s. Each paradigm constitute s a ne w and unive rsally applicable organizational logic for taking be st advantage of the we alth cre ating and mode rnizing pote ntial that drive s the whole Schumpe te rian 'gale of cre ative de struction'.
Thus, one could se e succe ssive te chnological re volutions involving an inte rre lated set of ne w te chnologies, industrie s and infrastructures, e stablishing a se t of innovative routine s in the form of a te chno-economic paradigm and lasting about half a ce ntury (Se e Table 1 ). Each se t, howe ve r, can only be come the standard after overcoming the resistance of those who had adopte d and practised the pre vious paradigm, who will fie rce ly hold on to it, e ve n if it is no longe r e ffe ctive .
It is whe n the se trajectories or me ta-routines approach the e xhaustion of the ir innovative possibilitie s that a paradigm shift is ne ce ssary. Radically bre aking with the e xhauste d paradigm and ope ning whole ne w traje ctorie s is the role of re volutionary innovators. It is in those case s that the Schumpe te rian vie w of routine s as obstacle s to change is fully valid. Ye t, those are pre cisely the situations whe n, to fulfill the ir role , the e ntre pre ne urs will re quire the support of bold and innovative banke rs, probably e ve n 're ckle ss' one s.
Production and Financial Capital: Different and Complementary Agents
Finance , in one form or anothe r, accompanie s most innovations, be the y incre me ntal or radical. De cisions to provide funds for innovations are only take n by the e ntre preneurs themselves in those cases whe n the y (or the ir firms) possess e nough we alth to be se lf-sufficient. In most situations, the actual funding de cision is take n by an inve stor or a bank manage r, a stockbroke r, a financial manage r inside a big firm 18 or some othe r financial agent. The que stion is: by what crite ria are those de cisions guide d? What give s the financial de cision-maker the 'fe e ling' that a particular proje ct is like ly to succeed? The answe r propose d in this chapte r is that the financial side follows similar crite ria to those followe d by innovation on the production side . It is the te chno-economic paradigm of e ach te chnological re volution that influe nce s the e ntrepreneurs and the financiers, the managers a nd the innovators, the inve stors and the consume rs, both in the ir individual de cisions and in the ir inte ractions. 19 In othe r words, the paradigm constitute s the common thought mode l of all the e conomic agents, the ir shared 'common se nse ', for the whole pe riod of propagation of that se t of te chnologie s. Ne ve rthe le ss, the re is a fundame ntal diffe re nce be twe e n the age nts of production capital and those of financial capital. The y will share the same paradigm and act in unison to fund growth and innovation, as long as it is succe ssful in practice and profitable. Howe ve r, once signs of e xhaustion appe ar, the diffe re nt de pth of commitment to a particular paradigm becomes evide nt. For the production e nte rprise , the e xhauste d traje ctory is profoundly e mbe dde d in e xisting inve stment in e quipme nt, in structures, in knowle dge and e xpe rie nce , in the organization and the pe rsonne l and in the e xte rnal ne tworks of supplie rs, distributors and clie nts. 20 For financial capital the paradigm is mainly a se t of crite ria for judging what was like ly to be succe ssful; basically a thought mode l, re lative ly e asy to abandon whe n it fails, no matte r how strongly roote d it may have be e n in ide as and in de cision-making practice .
Production capital is the age nt for the accumulation of we alth making capacity; its natural horizon is long-te rm and it re mains tie d to its e xpe rtise . Financial capital is the age nt for re allocating we alth in orde r to constantly maximize short-te rm re turns. Production capital is the re fore path-de pe nde nt while financial capital is fundame ntally footloose and fle xible . 21 This distinction in nature , function and motive s, be twe e n production capital and financial capital will unde rlie the e xplanation provide d be low of the cluste ring of bold financie rs in support of the swarms of e ntre pre ne urs in the e arly diffusion de cade s of a te chnological re volution.
Technological Revolutions and Great Surges of Development
As indicate d in Table 1 above , the world has witne sse d five te chnological uphe avals since the Industrial Re volution in England (although in Schumpe te r's life time only thre e and a half we re available for study). The y are the creative gales of de struction that Schumpeter calle d te chnological re volutions. In his vie w of the multi-cyclical nature of capitalism such massive changes unde rlay the longe st of the se cycles: the long wave s of e conomic growth, lasting around half a ce ntury. 22 Focusing on the propagation of the se te chnologica l re volutions and the ir assimilation by the e conomic and social system, the pre sent author has propose d the conce pt of gre at surge s of de ve lopme nt, 23 de parting from Schumpe te r's notion of long wave s in some fundamental aspects. Long wave s, in Schumpe te r's ve rsion, are me asure d by major fluctuations of GNP around the long -te rm dynamic e quilibrium growth tre nd. The y are the manife station of a te chnological re volution in the e conomic sphere and are a conseque nce of the ope ration of the marke t me chanism. In conformity with this notion, Schumpe te r se e s no role for gove rnment policy or social inte rve ntion, e xce pt in ve ry critical circumstance s. Long wave s are the re fore to be unde rstood as major e conomic cycle s. 24 Gre at surge s of de ve lopme nt, by contrast, re pre se nt the gradual inte gral transformation of both the te chno-economic and the socio-institutional sphe res of the social syste m, through the assimilation of e ach major cluste r of te chnical change . A gre at surge is thus de fine d as the proce ss by which a te chnolo gical re volution and its te chno-e conomic paradigm propagate across the e conomy, le ading to structural change s in production, distribution, communication and consumption, as we ll as to profound and qualitative social change s. Socie ty, in turn, influe nce s the path take n by the re volution. In othe r words, the conce pt stre tches far be yond the e conomy, to e ncompass socie tal -e ven cultural-change. 25 This significant shift in e mphasis and in scope le ads to ve ry diffe re nt dating and to anothe r way of conce ptualizing the re lationship be twe e n te chnological, e conomic and social changes as we ll as be tween financial and production capital. The change in the te rm, from wave s to surge s, formalize s this bre ak. 26
The Sequence of Diffusion of Each Technological Revolution
Each gre at surge is initiate d with a big-bang, a publicly re cognize d innovative bre akthrough that inflame s the imagination of e ntre pre ne urs and launche s the e ntre preneurial swarming in re stricted se ctors and ge ographic re gions, so much so that it is like ly to go unnotice d in e conomic statistics. It's the microproce ssor for the fifth, the Mode l-T for the fourth and so on back to Arkwrigths's Cromford mill for the first. From the big-bang on, the re is an e ve r more inte nse proce ss of diffusion and assimilation that in a fe w de cade s e nds up e ncompassing the bulk of activitie s in the core country or countrie s. Each re volution se ts a highe r pote ntial le ve l of productivity and quality across the board so that, e ach surge is the move ment onto that highe r productivity plate au of the whole group of core e conomie s involve d. 27 As shown in Figure 2 , the proce ss of diffusion involve d in e ach surge can be se e n as divide d into two pe riods: Installation and De ployme nt, e ach lasting around twe nty to thirty ye ars. The installation pe riod be gins with the big-bang of the te chnological re volution and re presents the battle of the ne w e ntre preneurs to ove rcome the re sistance of the old paradigm, which is de e ply e mbe dde d in the minds and the practices, in the e quipme nt and the e xpe rie nce , in the norms and the law, as we ll as in the powe r structure s of the e conomy and socie ty. The le ade rship of the proce ss in that pe riod move s incre asingly to the hands of financial capital, which can bre ak fre e from the powe r of incumbe nt production capital, now be coming conse rvative , and back the ne w e ntre pre ne urs in the proce ss of e stablishing the e me rging paradigm. A financial bubble usually characterizes the final phase of Installation. 'Canal mania' in the 1790s, 'railway mania' in the 1840s, the 'roaring 1920s' and the bubble of the 1990s are e xample s of such fre nzy phase s. 28 Thus the installation pe riod e nds with a financial collapse , afte r having accomplishe d its task, including the re place me nt of the industrie s -and firms-that act as the e ngine s of growth of the e conomy, the installation of the ne w infrastructure providing e xte rnalitie s for e ve rybody and the ge ne ral acceptance of the 'common sense' criteria for be st practice of the ne w paradigm.
Figure 2: Two Different Periods in the Diffusion of Technological Revolutions
Be twe e n the two pe riods -characte rize d as installation and deploymentthe re would usually be a re ce ssion of unce rtain duration, whe n all the ne gative social and e conomic conse que nce s of the bubble come to the fore and gathe r inte nse pre ssure for radical policy changes. The se ne w policie s ge ne rally te nd to re gulate financial practices and to contribute to the expansion of markets through public de mand or income re distribution. In e sse nce , at this turning point, the conditions are the re for the socio-institutional framework to be modifie d in ways that would make it possible for the ne w production capital, incarnate in the alre ady powe rful ne w firms and industrie s, to take the he lm of the e conomy away from financial capital. 29 The de ployme nt pe riod that follows is the re ign of the re ce ntly e stablishe d paradigm and involve s its growing e mbe ddedne ss in all sphe re s of socie ty. The e conomic proce ss is now incre asingly in the hands of the le ade rs of production capital, mainly the ne w but also the old giants alre ady mode rnize d. The me taroutine s of the paradigm are now e ffe ctive both for ope ration and growth and for continuous innovation, incre me ntal and radical, product and proce ss, organizational and te chnical. Major e xternalitie s, from low cost access to the ne w infrastructure to ade quate distribution channels and the e ducation of worke rs and consume rs, facilitate innovations compatible with the now e stablished paradigm. This share d logic based on share d advantage s le ads to the we aving of a strong me sh of e conomic inte r-re lations that te nds to mold, e xclude or marginalize innovations that are not dire ctly compatible with it. This pe riod e nds whe n the pote ntial of that re volution and its paradigm approach e xhaustion and the re is a constriction in the growth of marke ts, productivity and profits along the e stablishe d traje ctorie s. Howe ve r, no te chnological re volution grows in a 'gre e n fie ld site '. Be fore its big bang, the inte rve ning te chnologie s had gone through a long proce ss of ge station in the midst of the deployment pe riod of the pre vious paradigm, be ing shape d by its re quire ments. Ne ithe r do the industrie s and te chnology syste ms of a re volution disappe ar meekly at maturity. The y re main stubbornly struggling for survival, during the installation of the ne xt, and only gradually mode rnize adopting the ne w principle s whe n the y are force d by the marke t supe riority of the ne w paradigm. The se two long ove rlaps be tween the life cycles of succe ssive paradigms (se e Figure 3 ) are e sse ntial to the argume nt be ing pre se nte d he re , be cause the y are the sce ne of the battle s be twe e n the force s of ine rtia and the force s of change , and it is the conte xt and the nature of the se battle s that will de te rmine the quality and the quantity of te chnological and financial opportunitie s a t e ach phase .
Why Technical Change Occurs by Revolutions
For Schumpe te r te chnological opportunitie s 'are always pre se nt, abundantly accumulated by all sorts of pe ople'. 31 It is the e ntre pre ne urs who de cide whe n to turn those possibilitie s into innovations by e xe rcising the ir le ade rship (if the y find, of course , banke rs willing to finance the m). The re is e ve n a ve ry strong state ment in Schumpe te r's The ory of Economic De ve lo pme nt, warning that the e xce ssive e mphasis on inve ntion may be 'downright misle ading'. 32 While agre eing that the re lative inde pe ndence of scie ntific and te chnological re search constantly provide s a vast untapped pool of pote ntial innovations, 33 this still le ave s some big ope n que stions. If opportunitie s, e ntre pre ne urs and supportive banke rs are always e qually available , why doe s te chnical change occur by re volutions? Why do actual innovations cluste r and why do such cluste rs occur about e ve ry half a ce ntury? Some powe rful proce ss must be at work, providing an e xclusion-inclusion me chanism. 34 This pape r holds that the opportunitie s for e ntre pre ne urs to tap profitably into the pool of usable science and te chnology change strongly over time and are ve ry much shape d by the phase s of e ach surge of de ve lopme nt. 35 Spe cifically, as Kuzne ts originally sugge ste d, 36 the radical innovations conforming e ach successive te chnological re volution te nd to come together into a powe rful cluste r only whe n the de ployme nt of the pre vious re volution approaches e xhaustion and maturity. This notion was also at the core of Ge rhard Me nsch's Stale mate in Te chnology as an e xplanation of the cluste ring of innovations. 37
Embedded paradigms as inclusion-exclusion mechanisms
The me chanism a t work is the social e mbe dde dne ss of the te chno -e conomic paradigm and its role as provide r of e xte rnalitie s. During De ployme nt, the principle s of the paradigm are not only pre sent as common se nse in production, inve stment, trade and consumption; the y are a lso e mbe dde d in the te rritory in te rms of che ap infrastructure s, available supplie rs and distribution channe ls, ade quately trained pe rsonnel and e stablished re gulations, as we ll as e ntre nche d in the habits of a way of life . The se massive e xte rnalitie s work as a strong inclusion me chanism to favor product innovations that are compatible with the paradigm and follow its e xpe cted trajectories. Such products are re adily acce pte d and e asily wove n into the me sh of the growing e conomic syste m. In the fourth surge , for e xample , once most homes had e le ctricity and le arne d to use the first fe w e le ctrical appliance s, such as re frige rators, radios and vacuum cle ane rs, a whole se rie s of radical innovations we re e asily incorporate d into the production and distribution stre ams and into the way of life of consume rs, from washing machine s, food-ble nders and re cord players to dish washe rs, fre e ze rs and color -TV. The same happened with the long se rie s of important radical innovations in synthe tic materials and fibe rs, which we re gradually incorporated into the te xtile , e ngine ering, packaging and consume r goods industrie s, transforming the input profile of the e conomy and the machine ry re quire d for a wide spe ctrum of proce sse s.
Non-compatible products, by contrast, find it difficult to pe ne trate the e stablished patterns and te nd to e ithe r be shape d to adapt or to be marginalize d and e ve n e xclude d. In those case s, the re igning paradigm and its e mbe dde d e xte rnalitie s act as an e xclusion mechanism. Semiconductors in the ir initial phase , for instance , found an ide al mass production niche by serving to stre tch the life of mature consume r audio-e quipme nt, through making the m portable and re juve nating the ir marke ts. The first inte grate d circuits, howe ve r, we re marginalize d in he aring aids or spe cial military applications. Far back in history during the first gre at surge, the early steam engines we re used to drain wate r out of mine s, be fore anyone could imagine the major role the y would play in transport ye ars late r. It is out of those te c hnologie s that are ‚waiting in the wings‛, going through a sort of ge station pe riod, that the ne xt re volution is like ly to come toge the r, whe n conditions be come favorable .
During de ployme nt, the n, both production and financial capital are satisfie d with the succe ssive inve stment and innovation opportunitie s associate d with the succe ssive ne w te chnology systems of the curre nt te chnological re volution. Ne w products appe ar re gularly in e xpanding marke ts, strong companie s are furthe r stre ngthe ne d, and profits a re good, until maturity se ts in.
Exhaustion of opportunity trajectories leading idle money to search elsewhere
Once the re is paradigm constriction, once the innovation trajectories of successive products, industrie s and te chnology syste ms start drying up, the re are le ss and le ss profitable uses for the mass of profits still be ing produce d. Such idle mone y e nds up piling up in the hands of financial capital, which is re ady to e xpe rime nt. It will accompany production capital in its se arch for faraway marke ts and/or lowe r cost production site s and it might 'innovate ' in spe culative sche me s or in ways of making doubtfully le gitimate profit. 38 Financial capital is also like ly to find and fund two type s of e age r cre ditors with important conse que nce s. On the one hand, the re is the opportunity of making e asy loans abroad. From the canal building cre dit give n by the British to various State s in the USA during the maturity and de cline of the first surge (1820s-30s), to the dive rse forms of de ve lopme nt funding give n to the Third World in those of the fourth (1960s -70s), e ach wave of such loans has later le d to a de bt crisis. 39 On the othe r hand, the de arth of innovative opportunitie s in the old paradigm ope ns the e ye s of the financie rs to truly path-bre aking possibilitie s. The ne w e ntre preneurs, the pote ntial be arers of the ne xt te chnological re volution, can be notice d and can ge t the funds the y might not have secured a fe w ye ars e arlie r. It is the ir obvious initial succe ss that will, in Schumpe te rian fashion, launch the swarm of imitators. Both the e ntre pre ne urs and the financie rs will conce ntrate the ir e fforts and re sources on furthe ring, e xpanding and multiplying the pro ducts and industrie s of the ne w te chnology syste ms of the re volution. 40 
The role of finance in fostering the new paradigm
As Schumpe te r e xpe cte d, the ne w combinations will usually be made by ne w firms. 41 The e ntre pre ne urs pushing the te chnological re volution are like ly to be ine xpe rie nced in busine ss and will also ofte n be young. The y will, the re fore, need the he lp of banke rs or financie rs in more ways than just funding.
Ye t it is not e vide nt that the truly e xpe rie nce d financie rs will be capable of unde rstanding the e ssence of the ne w te chnologie s or of visualizing the implicit change in dire ction. The ir e xpe rtise is de eply rooted in the waning paradigm. J.P. Morgan, at the he ight of his powe r and afte r having be e n the financial brain prope lling the third surge , re buffed He nry Ford, conside ring automobile s as rich me n's toys. 42 Paradigm blindne ss is a natural phe nome non associate d with the 'ove r-adaptation' e xperienced by society as it e ngages in the full de ployme nt of a particular te chnological re volution. J. Watson Sr. the first he ad of IBM, le ss than two de cade s away from the information revolution, thought that a fe w compute rs would fulfill all of the world's ne e ds.
He nce , not only do the ne w e ntre preneurs need to be imbue d with the logic of the e me rging te chnologie s, the ir financial counte rparts ne e d to share that unde rstanding. This is why the e a rly financie rs of e ach te chnological re volution te nd to be family, frie nds and gradually, ve nture capitalists, who be lie ve in the te chnologies and are willing to take the risks that the big traditional one s will not assume . A much younge r J.P. Morgan in 1878 did take big risks with ne w ide as. He funde d Edison at the ve ry be ginning of e le ctricity. In a se nse , the e arly financie rs backing the re volutionary products are true risk take rs and ofte n participate actively in the busine ss management of the innovatio n proce ss itse lf. In this se nse , the y could be se e n as financial e ntre pre ne urs. 43 
An endogenous process with a specific rhythm
The gradual e xhaustion of the innovation pote ntial within the traje ctorie s of the pre vailing paradigm puts more and more idle mone y in the hands of financial capital, inducing it to bre ak loose and to go looking for whate ve r opportunitie s may be available outside the we ll-trodde n paths. The se arch will include supporting e ntre pre ne urs that are tapping the vast pool of possibilitie s unde re stimated by the pre vailing paradigm. This cre ates the conditions favorable for the coming toge the r of the ne xt te chnological re volution, which appe ars to both pote ntial e ntre preneurs and pote ntial financie rs as an opportunity e xplosion in what was be coming a barren innovation landscape . The e xtraordinary profits and the e xtraordinary growth rates that characterize the e arly innovations will be the force unle ashing the cluste rs of e ntre pre ne urs and bold financie rs.
Thus, the cluste ring of innovative e ntre pre ne urs -and of bold financie rs -is not a random phe nome non, e ve n though such audacious pote ntial age nts of change may be randomly distribute d in the population at any point in time . The conditions for the double cluste ring are e ndoge nously ge ne rate d by the te chnoe conomic syste m. It is the e xhaustion of the curre nt pote ntial that lifts the e xclusion me chanisms and ope ns the door for the aspiring e ntrepreneurs and the bold financie rs to come toge the r and bring forth ne w solutions.
The major advantage s provide d to the participants in the de ployme nt of a paradigm also e xplain the spacing be twe e n succe ssive re volutions, allowing e nough time for e ach one to run its course. The amounts of inve stme nt involve d in the growth of the ne w industrie s and in the e xpansion of e ach infrastructure , the ne e d to massive ly unle arn the old paradigm and adopt the ne w, the significant changes that must be induce d on the te rritory, in the institutions and in the minds of pe ople and socie ty, will all contribute to e xclude any ne w re volution from irrupting be fore most of the we alth cre ating pote ntial of the curre nt one has be e n e xploite d. That same e ne rgy of conte ntion and e xclusion will turn into a powe rful force to invite change, once the e stablishe d inve stme nt and profit opportunitie s dwindle .
Financial Bubbles as Massive Processes of Credit Creation
The irruption of a te chnological re volution finds an e nvironme nt that is ine vitably unfavorable and e ve n hostile . It is, by de finition, a bre akthrough; it is the abandonment of the accepted trajectorie s and practice ; it me ans the introduction of a nove l way of doing things and a se t of ne w products , industrie s and infrastructure s that thre ate n the e xisting one s in one way or anothe r. It is Schumpe te rian cre ative de struction at its most visible . It will the re fore e licit fe rocious resistance both from those that are re ally se t for losing and from thos e that have not ye t discove re d the y might be ne fit from it. 44 While the powe rful firms from the pre vious surge may be willing to use some of the ne w te chnologie s to stre tch the ir stagnant productivity or solve some of the ir proble ms, the y are unlike ly to be the champions of the e me rging conste llation. The y might, on the contrary, be particularly conservative, e specially if dire ct thre ats to the ir products are appare nt.
The power of finance backing the paradigm shift
The ne w firms are too small, too we ak or too ine xpe rie nce d to confront the re sistance of the e stablishment by the mselve s. The diffe rence betwe en we ight and rate marks the e arly diffusion of e ach technological re volution. The he avywe ights that still make the bulk of the e conomy grow slowly or de cline while those with the fast growth rate s are still too lightwe ight to make a major diffe re nce . Only with the incre asing powe r of financial capital on the ir side can the y succe ssfully wage the battle s to change the socio-institutional routine s, to ge ne rate the ade quate manpowe r, to e stablish the ne w norms and othe r favorable conditions and to re move the many obstacle s inhe rite d from the old paradigm. This is incre asingly important for financial capital, as it ge ts more and more involve d with the ne w te chnologie s and the ne w industrie s. As Schumpe te r insiste d it is the capitalist that face s the risk; 'the e ntre pre ne ur ne ve r be ars the risk'. 45 So the e arly ve nture capitalists are true adventurers and not me re bridge s for innovation. The y are in the front line of the battle against the old routine s and the obstacles and in favor of the construction of an e nabling e nvironment to facilitate the diffusion of the e me rging paradigm. Historically, the y have te nde d to do this through the unmitigate d de fe nce of fre e marke ts and laisse z faire , turning the installation pe riods into the harde st and most individualistic form of capitalism. He nce , in te rms of institutions, the cre ative de struction proce ss in this pe riod te nds to have an ove rdose of de struction. 46 In the e arly -or irruption-phase of the installation pe riod, both the e ntre preneurs and the ir financiers are e ngaged in an inte nse e xploration proce ss, trying to unde rstand what is succe ssful from the ne w range of the possible and unde r what conditions. This tria l and e rror proce ss involve s high risks and can yie ld high stake s. The highe r the prize s obtained, the more inte nse the swarms of imitators will be ; the more consistent the ke y fe atures of success, the more cle arly the ge ne ral traje ctorie s of the te chno -economic paradigm will be come visible facilitating furthe r innovation on a wide r and wide r spe ctrum.
The Mode l-T gave high visibility to the principle s for mass production, which soon fue lle d swarms of imitators not only in automobile s and the ir compone nts but also in othe r me chanical and e le ctrical manufacture s. 47 The full spre ad of the paradigm as such will come late r, whe n comple tely unre late d industrie s such as food, packaging or e ve n tourism make le aps in productivity and quality by applying the same principle s.
The making of the bubble
In e sse nce , the te chno-e conomic paradigm, once it is fully articulate d and has spre ad e nough, turns into a risk-re duction me chanism, partly re al, partly illusory. Gradually, ce rtain re ady-made formulas be come paths to re ady-made profits and the ne w financie rs entering the game no longe r ne ed to be so knowle dge able, only audacious. In the first surge , making a canal from any rive r to any othe r looke d naturally profitable . De cades later, in the 1840s, a railway uniting a ny two citie s was pe rce ive d as an obviously winning be t, just as in the late 1990s the dot.com craze was se e n as the quick path to be coming a millionaire . Whe the r such e xpe ctations are warrante d or not is irre le vant. The phe nome non has occurre d with e ve ry surge a de cade or two afte r the big-bang and, in e ve ry case , the faith in the profit making powe r of the industrie s and infrastructure s of the re volution spre ads wide ly and attracts all available mone y into the financial whirlpool. It is the making of the financial bubble , the collapse of which will e nd the installation pe riod.
Opportunitie s grow e xplosive ly. Innume rable e ntre pre ne urs will offe r also the ir proje cts to the growing numbe r of financie rs. If the y see m to follow the ne w paradigm, all proje cts, good and bad, hone st and crooke d, are like ly to have access to the required funds. In particular, the infrastructure of the re volution will be able to spre ad very far and will most like ly ove r-inve st, if judge d by its ove rall profitability and by the capac ity of the e conomy to use it at the time . Existing firms will also be funde d whe n the y propose to mode rnize by applying the ne w paradigm.
But again, the we ight-rate factors come into play. Eve n growing at an amazingly frantic pace , the ne w or mode rnizing industrie s cannot absorb the growing amounts of inve stment mone y brought to the stock marke t 48 in pursuit of the e xtraordinary profits now e xpe cte d by all. Howe ve r, financial capital will not be de te rre d. It will now innovate in ways that turn the stock marke t into a casino, de coupling from the re al e conomy and building e xtraordinary pape r mountains. It will spe culate with whate ve r is at hand, from gold to re al e state , and will also inve nt all sorts of bonds and de rivative s, inve rte d pyramids and e ve n le ss le gitimate schemes. 49 High profit e xpe ctations will be ke pt alive by the financial wizards in a growing atmosphere of ‚irrational e xuberance‛ 50 and, for a while , pe ople will actually re ceive the m, at le ast in the form of capital gains, e ve n if in the re al e conomy only ve ry fe w firms are ge ne rating le ve ls of profit to warrant such e xce ss confide nce (though some fraudule ntly simulate having the m).
Thus, the bold and e ntre pre ne urial financial capital of e arly installation be come s the re ckle ss capital of the late -or fre nzy-phase of that pe riod. In its se arch for ne we r and ne we r ways of guaranteeing a high re turn on all inve stment, be it re lated with the te chnological re volution or not, it syste matically contribute s to the hype rinflation of asse ts that unde rlie s the bubble . As pape r profits are furthe r re inve ste d in the same casino, the y inte nsify the phe nome non e ve n furthe r and attract ever more inve stors, including those who had ne ve r put the ir mone y anywhe re be yond the family coffe r or the corne r savings bank.
When the job is done, it's time for the changeover in leadership
In this way, financial capital unwittingly guarante e s that the industrie s and infrastructure s of the te chnological re volution will be come large e nough to influe nce the e conomy and the firms involve d powe rful e nough to se rve as the le ade rs and e ngines of growth for the ne xt de ployme nt pe riod. The bubble at the e nd of Installation can be unde rstood as a gigantic proce ss of colle ctive cre dit cre ation, orche strate d by the financial world in the stock marke t. 51 The collapse of the bubble will ine vitably come and much of the illusory paper we alth will disappe ar. But the installation of the paradigm in the minds and in the te rritory -as principle s, as industrie s and as fully-fle dge d infrastructure swill have be e n achie ve d.
Afte r the e nsuing re ce ssion re ve als the ills of the bubble and the te nsions be hind it, the re will be the ne e d to swing the pe ndulum back both in te rms of gre ater attention to social inte rests, as opposed to the greedy individualism fue led by the financial fre nzy, and of limiting the powe rs of financial capital, handin g the guidance of the e conomy over to production capital, now re pre se nte d by the ne w e ngine s of growth, which are re ady to de ve lop long -te rm e xpansion strategies. Disappointme nt with the stock marke t as a source of quick and e asy we alth re introduce s rationality in inve stme nt de cisions, 52 re gulation and othe r conditioning factors will bring financial capital back into a comple me ntary role , until the e nd of the surge calls it out again for the ne xt transformation. But the passage from Installation to De ployment can be a ve ry difficult political proce ss, full of te nsions, economic instability and unce rtainty; it can be short or quite long (the Turning Point of the fourth surge laste d from 1929 until the Bre tton Woods agre e me nts of 1943, almost at the e nd of WWI I). 53
Summary and Conclusion
This pape r has argue d that financial capital has a fundame ntal role in the articulation and propagation of te chnological re volutions. It also propose s an inclusion-e xclusion me chanism that would e xplain why te chnical change occurs by succe ssive re volutions with se ve ral de cade s be twe e n the m. In doing so, it re affirme d Schumpe te r's vie w of the cluste ring of e ntre pre ne urship in ce rtain pe riods. But, in contrast with Schumpe te r, it he ld that the bunching of inte nse radical change also brings forth clusters of bold -sometimes re ckle ss-financiers in support of the production e ntre pre ne urs. Major financial bubble s we re inte rpre ted as massive proce sse s of cre dit cre ation to install e ach te chnological re volution. The argume nts are roote d in a stylize d mode l of the diffusion and assimilation of te chnological re volutions based on historical re currence , the main purpose of which is to se rve as a he uristic de vice .
Finance and paradigm shifts
A ce ntral e le me nt in the mode l pre se nte d is the conce pt of te chno-e conomic paradigm as the se t of ge ne ric te chnologie s and organizational principle s that e me rge with e ach technological re volution and guide its diffusion, through be ing adopte d as shared be st-practice common se nse by all the e conomic age nts. It is this aspe ct of e ach te chnological re volution that provide s the pote ntial for mode rnizing the whole e conomy, which gradually re ache s a highe r productivity le ve l. This proce ss, de signated as a gre at surge of de velopment, would take about half a ce ntury to unfold in a ve ry une ve n manne r, some time s turbule nt, some time s more harmonious.
Each paradigm be comes so e mbedded in the te chno-e conomic and the socioinstitutional sphe res of society that compatible innovations be nefit from massive e xte rnalitie s and the ir succe ss and profitability are gre atly facilitate d. What is sugge ste d is that, through the age ncy of the e mbe dde d paradigm, e ach surge e stablishes an inclusion-e xclusion mechanism that rewards innovations following the me ta-routine s of the paradigm and discourages or re shape s or marginalize s non-compatible innovations, which would be much more difficult and le ss profitable .
Only whe n the pote ntial of that re volution is e xhauste d can the conditions be come favorable for the next re volution to come toge the r, but at that stage the ne w paradigm will confront e normous resistance. Incumbent producers are like ly to be among the main ine rtial forces. By its ve ry nature, production capital is tie d to its pre vious history of inve stme nt, knowle dge , e xpe rie nce , pe rsonne l and e xte rnal ne tworks.
Financial capital, by contrast, is fundamentally mobile . It can the re fore bre ak loose from the mature se ctors of the e conomy and re allocate funds to any e me rging te chnologie s outside the we ll-trodde n paths. In this manne r, it contribute s in the articulation of the ne xt te chnological re volution and the diffusion of its paradigm. In se arching its own e nrichme nt through sharing in the e xtraordinary profits of the ne w products and industrie s, it also he lps re mov e institutional obstacles and strengthens the successful e ntrepreneurial firms, which will gradually be come strong e nough to re place the e ngine s of growth of the pre vious paradigm and to take control ove r from financial capital.
The mode l thus propose s a causal chain with a me chanism for the spacing of te chnological re volutions, giving a role to financial capital in the ir articulation and in facilitating the re placement of the le ading firms of e ach surge . It is base d on the notion of te chno-e conomic paradigms as meta-routine s for innovation and on the functional se paration of production and financial capital. Both aspe cts would be e sse ntial to the dynamic characte r of capitalism.
Clusters of bold financiers and the invisible hand for credit creation
The bunching of innovation opportunitie s with the irruption of e ach te chnological re volution would be the cause be hind the pe riodic cluste ring of audacious e ntre pre ne urs. It would also e xplain the subse que nt cluste ring of bold -e ve n re ckle ss-financiers accompanying and fostering the paradigm shift and gradually le ading to a major financial bubble . The se recurring e pisodes of re ckle ss banking or stock marke t manias, rathe r than be ing anomalie s, would work as an invisible hand for massive cre dit cre ation, facilitating the full installation of e ach technological re volution and its paradigm.
The hype r-inflation of asse ts provide s e nough funds for e xpe rime nting wide ly with the ne w te chnological possibilitie s of the re volution, for mode rnizing much of the e xisting firms and plants, for ove r-inve sting in the ne w infrastructure and also for se tting up innume rable forms of casino -like spe culative sche me s.
Assigning a role to financial bubble s in the diffusion of te chnological re volutions would assign a role to re ckle ss finance in the dynamics of capitalist growth, ranging the phe nome non among the 'natural' fe ature s of capitalism, in stark contrast with Schumpe te r's vie w on the matte r.
The research ahead
Much re search is still re quire d to furthe r te st the validity of the mode l pre se nte d and to achie ve a de eper unde rstanding of the diffe re nce be twe e n the re curre nt phe nome na and the ir unique manife stations.
If the inte rpre tation pre se nte d he re is acce pte d as plausible , it be gs the que stion of the ine vitability of the bubble . Would this be the only way in which capitalism can install a paradigm and lure e nough capital into inve sting in its particular infrastructure to make it into an all-pe rvasive e xte rnality? Doe s unde rstanding the phe nomenon ope n the way for the co nstruction of a solution that is le ss socially painful?
In any case, furthe r re se arch will contribute to de e pe n the unde rstanding of the re lationship be twe e n finance and innovation as we ll as of the impact of te chnological innovation on financial practice . This could corre ct the imbalance that has he re tofore pre vaile d among Ne o-Schumpe te rians and -unhe e ding Schumpe te r's warnings against the m-would e nhance the capacity to provide policy re comme ndations. 26 S inc e 1983, in the author's work and in her collaboration with Chris Freeman (see Freeman and Perez 1988) both the term long waves and the dating were kept as close to S c humpeter's as the need for differentiation allowed. It was in 2000-02, in the process of developing the whole model -including the role of finance-that the break became indispensable. 27 For dates of big bangs and indication of core countries see the first column of Table 1 above. For further discussion and dating see , p. 20 and Ch. 5, especially pp. 56-59. 28 The third surge, from the 1870s, is a peculiar case partly because it constitutes the first proc ess of globalization and the first confrontation for the role of core country in the world ec onomy, through the forging ahead of the US A and Germany as challengers and the dec line of British power. For a brief discussion, see p. 58.
29 Perez (2002) Ch. 11. 30 The figure evokes Mensch's (1975 Mensch's ( :1979 metamorphosis model of cycles of structure c hange. 31 S c humpeter (1911:1961) , p. 88. S ee also p. 197. 32 S c humpeter (1911:1961) , p. 89. 33 From the 1980s, a strong tendency has become prevalent towards forcing publicly funded researc h to be of immediate relevance to existing industry and towards concentrating support on the few already successful centers of excellence. One could ponder about the medium and long-term consequences of this for radical innovation potential. 34 This was one of the main challenges made by Rosenberg and Frischtak (1984) to long wave proponents 35 Perez (2002), Ch. 3, pp. 27-35. 36 Kuznets (1953) , p.113.
37 Mensc h (1975 Mensc h ( :1979 . 38 For the behavior of financial capital when the fourth surge reached maturity, from the 1960s onwards, see S trange (1986).
39 Perez (2002), Ch. 8. 40 Every one of these processes takes a uniquely different form, depending on the peculiar features of the particular revolution. There is a huge difference between designing and making minic omputers in a garage and designing and making steam engines, Bessemer steel c onverters or electrical generators. 41 S c humpeter (1911:1961), pp. 66, 75, 137, and 156. 42 Chernow (1990) , p. 221.
43 Janeway (1986) suggests that venture capital plays a double role as banker and entrepreneur. 44 S c humpeter (1911:1961) , pp 86-87. 45 S c humpeter (1911:1961), pp 75, 137 and (1939:1982) , p. 104. 46 It should be noted that in many cases the technologies at the center of the revolution are based on a previous accumulation of a common pool of scientific and technical knowledge, often funded by public institutions, during the gestation period and even earlier. But once they make the market breakthroughs and become the source of extraordinary profits, there is enough attraction for private funds to take over, even for a substantial part of the required scientific research. 47 The growth of the core industries of each technological revolution is at the heart of the rise and c ollapse of the stock market boom. The striking similarities in the behavior of the PC industry (in the fifth surge) and the automobile industry (in the fourth), in terms of stoc k market price volatility, number of firms and sales volumes, are shown in Mazzuc ato (2002) . 48 The attrac tion becomes so powerful that after the funds that would normally be tagged for investment have moved towards an equity preference, potential investors turn to bank loans to enter the stock market (For the case in the 1920s, see Hoover 1929, p. xii). This aspec t approximate s the present interpretation to those that explain bubbles as overextended credit booms. A particularly interesting analysis of the 1929 crash and its aftermath along these lines is found in Eichengreen and Mitchener (2003) .
49 ), Ch. 10 and 13. 50 S hiller (2000 . 51 In the first two surges, the stock market was not fully developed and the bubbles were inflated by bold ambitious characters such as Hudson in the British railway boom of the 1840s. But the basic social nature of the money whirlpool phenomenon is the same. xii-xiv) reports that he repeated his pre -NAS DAQ collapse surveys and found to his dismay that the excess confidence in equity investment had hardly been dented by the c rash . This has not been typical of previous surges, which would suggest an interesting pec uliarity of the present case, in the sense of not providing enough social pressures towards regulatory intervention to curb financial capital.
53 pp. 125-26.
